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Counsel for Petitioner respectfully submits the following Reply Brief pursuant to
Rule 50, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
FACTS
1.

On or about April 6,1990, the fact that Peter W. Billings and Peter W.

Billings, Jr., are both partners for Fabian and Clendenin came to the attention of E. H.
Fankhauser, counsel for Petitioner.
2.

After further inquiry, counsel for Petitioner confirmed the fact that both

Peter W. Billings and Peter W. Billings, Jr. are related to the Hon. Judith Billings by
affinity within the third degree, to wit: Father-in-Law and Brother-in-Law respectively.
3.

Judge Judith Billings wrote the opinion in the case of Regional Sales

Agency. Inc.. v. Reichert. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), having sat on
the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals that heard the case.
4.

Bryce Roe of Fabian & Clendenin was Counsel for Respondent Regional

Sales Agency, Inc.
5.

The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, written by Judge Billings,

reversed and remanded on issues which are monetarily of interest to Bryce Roe and the
firm of Fabian & Clendenin.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Petitioner desires to clarify an error in his initial petition for a writ of certiorari.
The last paragraph of Petitioner's "Summary of the Opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals" reads:
This Court should note that in each case where the
trial court entered a discretionary ruling contrary to
the RegionaTs interests, that the Court of Appeals
reversed and in the case where the trial court
exercised its discretion in favor of the interests pf
Petitioner, the Court of Appeals upheld the lowter
court.

Brief of Petitioner at 2. (emphasis added) That paragraph is hereby changed to read:
This Court should note that in each case where the trial court
entered a discretionary ruling contrary to RegionaTs
interests, that the Court of Appeals reversed and in the case
where the trial court exercised its discretion in favor of the
interests of Regional, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court.
POINT II
The Utah Supreme Court should grant the request of Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari in
order to correct the failure of Judge Billings to disqualify herself from the proceedings
before the Utah Court of Appeals due to her relationship to partners of thefirmof Fabian &
Clendenin.
The legal profession generally, and the bench in particular, has been charged with
the duty to uphold the highest of ethical standards, among which is the duty to disqualify
oneselffromjudicial proceedings in order to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. In
a recent case, this Court confirmed the wisdom such standards:
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias,
but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of
unfairness.
Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), at 1221 The
Anderson case not only established the fact that there are rules of conduct and statutes
requiring a Judge to either disclose certain conflicting interests (or potentially conflicting
interests) to the parties or to disqualify oneself from the proceedings, but additionally, that
it may be unconstitutional not to do so. The United States Supreme Court held that:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process.
In re Murchison. 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed.2d 942 (1955).
Utah Code Ann. §78-7-1, et seq. requires Judge's to disqualify themselves for
certain relationships or interests with either parties to litigation, or the litigation itself. In
order to comply with the requirements of this statute, a Judge or Justice must know or be
2

able to determine, whether or not a party to litigation is related by either consanguinity or
by affinity within the third degree, calculated as per the rules of common law. Although
Judge Billings, is not a party to this case, she nevertheless must know or be able to
determine her own family interests or potential interests in litigation to the third degree,
including relationships based upon common-law affinity. One could not reasonably argue
that she is unaware of her relationship by affinity to her father-in-law or her brother-in-law,
or of theirfinancialinterest in the outcome of this case as partners of thefirmrepresenting
Respondent
In addition to the relative bright line rules of the Utah Code, the Code of Judicial
Conduct sheds significant light upon the reasons for which a Judge should either disclose
an interest or potential interest to the parties to litigation, which may result in the need for
disqualification. Canon 3(Q(l)(d)(iifl of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifies and
requires disqualification if:
(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse
of such a person
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
This portion of the Code of Judicial Conduct applies to the facts at hand, and Judge
Billings should have disqualified herself from the proceedings. There is no doubt that the
firm of Fabian & Clendenin (and the partners) profitsfromthe reversals specified in the
opinion written by Judge Billings. This Court should grant the Writ requested in order to
determine the issue of judicial misconduct on the part of Judge Billings.
Canon 3(D) of the Code of Judicial Conduct allows a judge with a potentially
conflicting interest which could be a violation of the canons to present the issue of conflict
to the parties, and allow the parties to waive the requirement of disqualification. Judge
Billings never made the relationship known to the parties. Instead counsel for the
3

Petitioner had to discover such conflict of interest. Counsel was thereafter placed in the
uncomfortable position of explaining the conflict of interest to his client, being able to offer
no valid explanation to his client as to why Judge Billings did not disqualify herself or
make her relationship known. The purpose of the canons of judicial ethics is to avoid even
the appearance of impropriety and unfairness, The fact that Petitioner's cause was reversed
substantially on review by the Court of Appeals, especially by the very active and
aggressive role taken by Judge Billings at and following oral argument, is inexplicable to
Petitioner as a lay person seeking his day in a fair and impartial court The parties must
waive theirrightto disqualification of a judicial officer based upon a disclosed partiality or
impartiality, not counsel or the bench. The canons of judicial conduct have placed the
power to waive in the hands of the parties. Therefore, this Court should review the
arguments of Petitioner herein, notfromthe point of view of whether or not an attorney or
Justice of the Court would be offended by the conduct of Judge Billings, but from the point
of view of the lay person, whose interest in fairness and impartiality is at stake.
Petitioner's request for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted in order for this Court to
clarify the conduct of judges who actually have or may have an improper conflict of interest
in litigation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /O
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this.

.day of.

J#/?/tSM/

• 1990,1

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplementary Brief of Petitioner for Writ
of Certiorari, first-class postage prepaid, to:
BRYCEEROE
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151

^/f^i^^

5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant, and Cross-Respondent
below, Respondent herein,

v.
ROLAND W. REICHERT,
Defendant/Respondent and CrossAppellant below, Petitioner herein.

AFFIDA VIT OF E. H. FANKHAUSER
SUPPORTING REPLY OF
PETITIONER TO
RESPONDENTS BRIEF
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petition No:

EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER, duly sworn, deposes and states under oath:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts alleged herein.

2.

I am an attorney in good standing licensed in the State of Utah,

3.

I am counsel for Petitioner herein.

4.

I have diligently and timely executed the forms and documents and other

papers required in this Petition, based upon the facts available to me at the time of executing
said documents and papers.
5.

On or about April 6,1990,1 became aware for the first time of the fact that

Judge Judith Billings, who wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals in the case of
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, was possibly related to certain partners at the firm
of Fabian & Clendenin, counsel for Respondent herein.
6.

I subsequently initiated a diligent inquiry into the relationship of Judge

Billings and Peter Billings and Peter Billings Jr., and discovered that they are Judge
Billing's Father-in-Law and Brother-in-Law, respectively, and that they are partners at
Fabian & Clendenin.
7.

I was surprised to learn of this since Judge Billings had made no mention to

me or my client of her relationship with thefirmrepresenting Respondent.

8.

I thereafter initiated legal research which resulted in the writing of the Reply

Brief, to which this Affidavit is annexed.
9.

I have explained the relationship of Judge Billings to my client, Roland W.

Reichert, Petitioner herein, who was shocked to learn of these facts and feels that he was
the victim of injustice based upon his perception of bias on the part of Judge Billings.
10.

Further affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

day of

&M/1-—'. 1990.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ON this 10

April

before me

day of

, 19 9 0

Ephraim H. Fankhauser

personally appeared

signer of the foregoing instrument,

who duly acknowledged to me that s/he executed the same*?
Residing at: Sal

Utah

My Comm'n e;
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FACTS
Respondent's brief contains statements which are in error and
require clarification or verification by Appellant for the benefit of the
Court. Respondent states in its brief at page 5, "the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order against Reichert on March 28, 1984." This
statement is incorrect. Regional Sales, as Plaintiff, filed a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction with the trial court. (R 13-15) The Motion for
Preliminary Injunction was denied after evidentiary hearing before Judge
Croft. (See Memorandum Decision R. 48-50, R 61-66)
The record regarding and chronology of Defendant's motions to
amend his counterclaim need clarification. The first Amendment to
Counterclaim of Defendant was filed on April 30, 1987 (R. 132-133), and
was for the purpose of adding the affirmative defense of failure of
consideration based on the documentary information obtained at the
deposition of Helen Kiholm taken shortly before on April 23, 1987. The
documentation consisted mainly of the corporate tax returns and earnings
of Regional Sales Corporation, which documents were presented in the trial
before Judge Russon. Reichert deemed the Amendment to the
Counterclaim appropriate in view of paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint
which alleged "all conditions precedent to Defendant's liability under the
agreement have been performed or have occurred." (Paragraph 9 was
summarily denied, R. 29, paragraph 4 of Answer) Inherent in this
allegation is the argument that Regional Sales alleged full performance on
its part under the 1979 agreement. Denial of that paragraph, and the
claims of the Counterclaim as first submitted placed the performance of
Regional Sales under the alleged 1979 agreement at issue. The
documentation obtained at the deposition of Helen Kjholm, which had not

been previously available although it had been requested by Defendant,
clearly indicated that Regional Sales had failed to pay the 40% commission
earned by Mr. Reichert from 1977 through 1983, asrequiredby the
alleged agreement of 1979. This argument was clearly set forth in the
Amendment to Counterclaim. (R. 132)
Respondent, Regional Sales, at page six of its brief takes issue with
the statement of Reichert regarding the basis upon which Judge Russon
recused himself. Regional Sales states that Reichert's contentions are not
true, to wit: Judge Russon recused himself "due to the evasive conduct of
Mrs. Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct of counsel." For
whatever importance this issue may have to this Court, Mr. Reichert calls
attention to the record in this matter, beginning at the transcript page
number 77:
THE COURT:
Mr. Fankhauser, I want you to
wait for the witness. You keep speaking over.
Let me say this: If you are trying to make the
trier of fact understand what you are trying to
get at, you are not doing too red hot of a job.
You cut in so. Then, I cannot understand what
the answer is, and I don't know what she has said.
I have gone on like this for a page an a half. You
need to ask questions and let her answer.
FANKHAUSER: What I am having a problem
with, the witness does not respond to the question.
She gives me a narrative.
THE COURT:
I have heard a lot of narratives
in Court and that certainly is objectionable if she
does that. She needs to answer your question.
Sometimes when she is answering your question,
she gets about four words out, you cut her off and
go right on to something else. I won't argue with
you. Move on and do what I am saying.
4

FANKHAUSER: I am explaining why I am
doing what I am doing.
THE COURT:
Let's call a recess and I will see
both counsel in chambers.
During the recess , in chambers, Judge Russon made an offer to
recuse himself from the case, as substantiated at page 72 of the
Supplemental Transcript, as follows:
THE COURT:
We had a meeting in chambers.
I have offered to Mr. Fankhauser as settlement, a
recusal. He has asked me to recuse myself and I
will do that. The case is terminated at this point.
Based upon the transcript of the proceedings before Judge Russon, as cited,
the statement of Respondent and footnote 1 of its brief, are incorrect.
Following the recusal of Judge Russon, Defendant filed a new motion
to Amend Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, pursuant to Rule 15,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which motion was timely filed. At that
time Defendant proposed amending his Answer and Counterclaim to
include failure of consideration and, for the first time, the affirmative
defense of breach of contract. (R. 160-61) This motion was filed on May
22, 1987, several months prior to trial before Judge Brian.
Mr. Reichert wishes to clarify the giving of jury instructions in
response to the arguments of Regional Sales that it was error when the
court failed to give instruction number eight. Instruction number eight is
found at R. 187. This requested instruction was submitted on December
14, 1987. thereafter, Regional Sales submitted supplemental requested jury
instructions on December 16, 1987, and requested that its instruction
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number eighteen be given if the court refused to give number eight. The
court below thereafter made the substitution as requested. Therefore, the
instruction actually given to which Regional Sales objects pertaining to
liquidated damages is its own instruction.
Finally, regarding Regional Sales arguments for attorney's fees, this
Court should carefully note several important deficiencies in Mr. Roe's
affidavit for fees. (R. 313-315) Paragraph four of the affidavit
acknowledges that he was unable to obtain the actual hours worked during
the period of January 24, 1984 to December 31,1985, while he was at Roe
& Fowler. Instead, he "estimated" the figure of 42 hours, all of which
apply to the failed attempt at an injunction and related matters. Mr. Roe
states that his customary rate is $130 per hour, but fails to even allege that
this is a reasonable rate for the services performed, the complexity of the
case, or that the rate is reasonable when compared to other rates in the area
for similar work. Instead, he simply states a self-interested opinion that the
hours billed and the rate charged are reasonable.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Judge Brian's Failure to Grant Reichert's Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim, made pursuant to Rule 15. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Constituted an Abuse of Discretion
As has been previously argued, Judge Brian's failure to grant
Reichert's Motion to Amend Counterclaim constituted an abuse of
discretion . The denial of the motion was not in the interests of justice and
did not promote a trial on the merits of the case, but summarily dismissed
important claims of Reichert for affirmative relief. Furthermore, Judge
Brian, relying on the previous ruling of Judge Russon regarding the
6

amendment of Reichert's Coimterclaim, failed to take into consideration the
fact that Judge Russon had not ever ruled on Reichert's claim of breach of
contract which was raised for the first time before Judge Brian. Such was
a further abuse of discretion. The motion to amend should have been
granted, and Reichert should have had his day in court. Certainly, the
granting of the motion would have eliminated all sorts of potential
confusion regarding the use of parol evidence regarding whether or not the
1979 agreement was a sham. The jury verdict should stand, or in the
alternative, if remanded, Reichert should be allowed to bring his
counterclaim for breach of contract, which remedy the Court of Appeals
improperly denied.
POINT II
Regional Sales incorrectly asserts that its performance under the
1979 agreement was not at issue. This Court may note that the bulk of Mr.
Reichert's defense and case rested upon claims that the performance of
Regional Sales was at issue, and that they had not performed under the
1979 agreement which they sought to enforce. Reichert raised these issues
in an effort to contest the prima facie case of Regional Sales for breach of
contract on his part. The breach of regional Sales was committed from
1979 through 1983, following the execution of the 1979 agreement.
Regional did not pay the 40% commissions to Reichert in that time, but
continued to operate under the previous oral agreement to the end of 1982,
which provided that Reichert would be paid a salary. Since the breach of
Regional Sales preceded that alleged against Reichert, and since the
agreement of 1979 was a sham, Reichert was relieved of performance
under the agreement, according to his defenses, the evidence and his
arguments before, during and after trial. Regional Sales was therefore not
7

entitled to damages at all. Such a denial of damages going to Regional
Sales constitutes a straightforward "negative" defense by Reichert.
Negative defenses do not require separate pleading, as do affirmative
defenses. In this sense, set off and recoupment may or may not require
separate pleading, depending on the manner of their use. If they are used
to seek an affirmative recovery, they require a separate pleading. If they
are used in a purely defensive manner, i.e., to address the prima facie
elements of Plaintiffs case, or used to defend against the allegations raised
by Plaintiff, then they do not require separate pleading under rule 8(c),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Professor Moore states, regarding pleading of "affirmative defenses"
not listed in Rule 8(c):
An analysis of Plaintiffs Prima Facie case is
necessary in applying the [clause in Rule 8(c)
which requires affirmative pleading of "any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense"]. Any matter that does not tend to
controvert the opposing parties prima facie case
as determined by applicable substantive law
should be pleaded, and is not put in issue by a
denial made pursuant to Rule 8(b).
Moore. Pleading and Procedure, at 8-182. commenting on Rule 8, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, the definition of a negative defense is one raised by mere
denials, which address the prima facie claims of Regional Sales. Insofar as
set off and recoupment were used by Reichert to mitigate or deny the
damages claimed by Regional Sales, they constituted negative defenses
raised by Reichert's denials. Evidence supportive of these denials was
properly admitted, even though the same evidence could be also used to
8

support an affirmative claim for relief. The verdict of the jury was not
therefore tainted by the admission of evidence by Reichert relating to the
failure of performance of Regional Sales. The Court of Appeals erred in
finding that such evidence was improperly admitted and in holding that it
confused the jury, and in further holding that Reichert, on remand, would
not be allowed to use such evidence, even in a purely defensive manner.
If, contrary to Reichert's contentions, this Court holds that Reichert
was required to affirmatively plead breach of contract and that his motion
to include this in his counterclaims was properly denied, we must examine
the effect of a failure to plead. Professor Moore states:
If an affirmative defense is not pleaded it is
waived to the extent that the party who should
have pleaded the affirmative defense may not
introduce evidence in support thereof.
Moore at 8-184.
If Reichert failed to plead an affirmative defense in claiming set off
and recoupment, nevertheless, he was free to use any and all evidence
provided by Regional Sales to advance his claims, and would have been
limited only to the extent that he attempted to introduce his own
independent evidence.
Regional Sales contentions that the admission of exhibit "I"
constituted error are not well founded in view of the fact that they were all
based upon evidence provided by Regionals Sales which was previously
admitted. Exhibit "I" (see T. 175-182) was based upon invoices maintained
by Regional Sales for the year 1981. Exhibit 10, introduced by Regional
Sales also involved the use of those invoices used by Reichert. (T. 219-227,
especially 221 and 226-7) Therefore, Exhibit "I" is merely a reliance upon
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evidence before the jury in the form of Exhibit 10. Reichert was therefore
entitled to introduce Exhibit "I" and argue its contents, in spite of
contentions of failure to plead breach of contract as an affirmative defense
or claim.
POINT III
There was no Error in Giving Instruction Eighteen in Place of Requested
Instruction Eight.
Regional Sales complains of error in the giving of instruction
eighteen in place of requested instruction eight. As has been previously
mentioned, Instruction eighteen was suggested by Regional Sales in the
event that number eight was not given. According to Utah law, this does
not constitute appealable error:
Under Utah law, a party on appeal may not assign
as error either the giving or failure to give an
instruction unless he first proposes correct
instructions, and should the court fail to give
them, to then except thereto.
Snyderville Transp. Co.. Inc. v. Christiansen. 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980).
Since Regional Sales requested replacement instruction (number
eighteen) was in fact given, there was not appealable error. The jury
verdict should therefore be allowed to stand.
Conclusion
In addition to those arguments and points previously made by
Reichert, this reply brief supplements and clarifies the issues of this appeal
in several importance regards. First, the Motion to Amend Counterclaim
was wrongfully denied by Judge Brian. It was made well in advance of
trial before Judge Brian, and did not result in prejudice since the
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performance of Regional Sales was already contested by the original
Answer and Counterclaim. Furthermore, it contained the claim of breach
of contract, which Judge Brian did not address, but which was never before
raised in pleadings or otherwise. Second, Set off and recoupment were
proper issues before the trier of fact and addressed the very heart of
Regional Sales claims, which were denied in the Answer and Counterclaim
originally filed by Reichert. Third, the giving of Jury instruction eighteen
was not appealable error since it was the requested replacement of Regional
Sales itself. Fourth, as has been pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the
affidavit of Mr. Roe regarding attorney's fees was wholly deficient in
several important regards, as stated in the cases previously cited, including
Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), and Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), which summarizes the law of Trayner
and previous cases on this point.
The Court of Appeals erred in placing itself in the stead of the trier
of fact. Again Reichert would remind this Court and counsel that the
verdict herein was a "black box" general verdict, and not a special verdict.
Therefore, the risk of substituting the appellate court's judgment
improperly for that of the trier or fact runs high. The jury verdict should
stand. If, however, this case is again remanded, Mr. Reichert should be
given the opportunity to have his day in court, to make his claims and
counterclaims, and to allow fairness and justice to be served thereby.
Respectfully submitted this CTday of
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